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Abstract—This paper presents a key generation system derived
from the channel response of individual subcarrier in orthogo-
nal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) systems. Practical
aspects of the security were investigated by implementing our key
generation scheme on a wireless open-access research platform
(WARP), which enables us to obtain channel estimation of
individual OFDM subcarriers, a feature not currently available
in most commercial wireless interface cards. Channel response of
individual OFDM subcarrier is usually a wide sense stationary
random process, which allows us to find the optimal probing
period and maximize the key generation rate. The implementa-
tion requires cross layer design as it involves interaction between
physical and MAC layer. We have experimentally verified the
feasibility and principles of key generation, and also evaluated
the performance of our system in terms of randomness, key gen-
eration rate and key disagreement rate, which proves that OFDM
subcarrier’s channel responses are valid for key generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is vulnerable due to its broadcast
nature. Physical layer security (PLS) which aims to achieve
perfect secrecy therefore has been received extensive research
interest [1]. PLS research mainly can be divided into two
branches: secret key-based secrecy [2], [3] and keyless security
based on Wyner’s wiretap channel [4]. However, keyless
security schemes usually require full/part channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of eavesdroppers, which is not always available
in practice [5]. Therefore, there has not been any practical
implementation of keyless security schemes reported.
Secure key generation from noisy channels, an active re-
search direction of secret key-based secrecy, is one of the few
PLS techniques that have been reported to be implementable
in current commercial wireless devices [6], [7]. This technique
exploits the randomness of common wireless channels to
establish secure keys at each side of a link between two
legitimate users. It does not require perfect CSI, as the users
are able to reach an agreement on keys through public discus-
sion [8]. Encryption key is traditionally shared by public key
cryptography, which is computationally secure. In contrast,
key generation is information-theoretic secure [3], which is
a promising technique to establish encryption keys.
There have been several practical key generation systems re-
ported, employing IEEE 802.11 [9]–[14], IEEE 802.15.4 [15]–
[18], ultrawideband (UWB) [19], TV and radio signals [20].
IEEE 802.11 is the most widely adopted wireless technique
in key generation due to its widespread application in our
daily life. Received signal strength (RSS) is currently the most
popular parameter used for key generation [9]–[11] because it
is available in off-the-shelf commercial WiFi network interface
cards (NICs). However, RSS-based systems suffer from a low
key generation rate (KGR) as this approach only extracts
randomness from a single dimension. CSI-based systems can
provide a higher KGR as CSI is a finer-grained channel
parameter [21]. However, CSI is not available in most WiFi
NICs with the current exception of Intel WiFi Link 5300
wireless NIC [22], which makes key generation from CSI
feasible [12], [13]. As the Intel WiFi Link 5300 wireless NIC
supports IEEE 802.11n, multiple-antenna diversity was used
to exploit a finer-grained spatial channel characteristics [14].
There is also research interest using customized hardware
platforms to extract randomness from some special parameters,
for example, generating keys from the peak of the channel
impulse response (CIR) by using an FPGA-based 802.11
platform [10].
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are another hot appli-
cation area of key generation [15]–[18]. The CC2420 is a
2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver and widely
used in WSN nodes, such as MicaZ and TelosB. CSI is
not available in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard so only RSS-
based key generation systems can be implemented. Also,
because sensor nodes are usually constrained by computational
capacity, energy consumption and low mobility, particular
challenges arise in the application of key generation to WSNs,
as special attention has to be paid to the design of the key
generation scheme [15], [16]. There are also research efforts to
extract keys in other wireless systems. The application of key
generation in a UWB system was verified using a measurement
system composed of an oscilloscope, a waveform generator,
etc [19]. FM and TV signals were also used for key generation
by employing universal software radio peripheral (USRP) for
channel measurements [20].
Our work differs from [12], [13], which also extract keys
from CSI. The work in [12] generates key from all the
subcarriers. However this approach can introduce redundancy
whenever the channel experiences flat fading, as this can
produce periodic runs of ones and zeros, leading to reduced
randomness and hence security. The authors in [13] randomly
select some key bits from the key streams generated from
all the subcarriers and validate if the selected keys are the
same at both users, which quickly becomes very inefficient
whenever there are poor channel conditions, as a single key
bit mismatch will result in a restart of the entire recombination
process. We have proposed to generate keys from the channel
responses of individual subcarriers in orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, using a statistical
channel model [23]. We have proved that channel response of
individual OFDM subcarrier is usually a wide sense stationary
(WSS) random process, which allows us to find the optimal
probing period and maximize the KGR.
In this paper, we verify its feasibility through imple-
mentation on the wireless open-access research platform
(WARP) [24] running an IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and a
distributed coordination function (DCF) MAC. A key objective
here is to make minimal or even no changes to the off-the-shelf
wireless standard. This presents new research challenges, as it
requires cross layer design. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a practical OFDM subcarrier’s channel
response-based key generation scheme implemented on
the WARP hardware using data and ACKnowledgement
(ACK) packets to measure the channel. This enables us to
carry out the channel measurements without changing the
IEEE 802.11 protocol, and ensures that the time differ-
ence between these measurements is kept very small. In
this way, we can reduce the impact on channel reciprocity
caused by asynchronous measurements.
• We have experimentally verified the key generation prin-
ciples: temporal variation and channel reciprocity. We
also evaluated the performance of our key generation sys-
tem in terms of randomness, KGR, and key disagreement
rate (KDR). Through the verification and performance
evaluation, we find that OFDM subcarrier’s channel re-
sponses are valid for key generation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces the related IEEE 802.11 PHY and MAC protocol, and
the WARP hardware which we used in our implementation.
Section III presents the test scenarios and WARP setup. We
verify the key generation principles in Section IV and evaluate
the performance of our key generation system in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
We implemented our OFDM subcarrier’s channel response-
based key generation system using WARP boards running
the IEEE 802.11 OFDM and DCF MAC. In this section, we
introduce the related IEEE 802.11 physical and MAC layer
protocols and the WARP hardware platform.
A. Related IEEE 802.11 Protocol
1) OFDM PHY: The IEEE 802.11 a/g/n standards [25]
adopt OFDM to modulate the signal. The physical layer packet
of IEEE 802.11 OFDM consists of a preamble, a SIGNAL
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Fig. 1. Structure of IEEE 802.11 OFDM physical layer packet. The length
of the blocks in the figure is not scaled.
field, and a DATA field, as shown in Fig. 1. The preamble is
used for automatic gain control (AGC), synchronization and
channel estimation, and is equivalent to 4 OFDM symbols in
length. The SIGNAL field carries the information of convolu-
tional coding rate R and the mapping scheme for the DATA
field and forms a complete OFDM symbol. The number of
OFDM symbols of the entire physical layer packet can be
calculated as
NOFDM = 4 + 1 + d lMAC × 8 + 16 + 6
Nsubc ×Nbpsc ×Re, (1)
where lMAC is the number of bytes of the MAC packet, Nsubc
is the number of data subcarriers and equals 48 in IEEE 802.11
standard, and Nbpsc is the number of bits per subcarrier which
is determined by the mapping scheme.
Least square channel estimation is widely used to estimate
the channel with the aid of long training symbols (LTSs) in
IEEE 802.11 OFDM system. The estimated channel can be
given as
Ĥuv(fm, t) = Huv(fm, t) + ŵuv(fm, t), (2)
where fm is the mth subcarrier’s carrier frequency, Huv(fm, t)
is the theoretical channel response, and ŵuv(fm, t) is the noise
effect for each subcarrier, u is the transmitter (Tx) and v is
the receiver (Rx). The channel response of each subcarrier, i.e.,
Ĥuv(fm, t), provides information on the attenuation of each
subcarrier/frequency by the channel and noise against time,
which is an ideal randomness source for key generation.
2) DCF MAC: In IEEE 802.11, the DCF is used to coor-
dinate access to the wireless medium, which is the basis of
the standard carrier sense multiple access/collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) access mechanism. In order to ensure reliable
reception of the unicast frame, a positive ACK frame is
transmitted from Rx to Tx after waiting a short interframe
space (SIFS) when Rx successfully receives a data packet from
Tx, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
When IEEE 802.11 network is configured as an infras-
tructure basic service set (BSS), the network is handled by
an access point (AP) that broadcasts Beacon frames to all
the users, i.e., mobile stations (STAs), in its communication
range, typically every 100 ms. The Beacon carries information
about the BSS parameters, e.g., timestamp, service set identity
(SSID), Beacon interval, etc. STAs can use these information
to identify the network and keep synchronized to the AP.
B. WARP Hardware Platform
CSI is not made public in most commercial NICs. There is
a Linux driver developed for the Intel WiFi Link 5300 wireless
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Fig. 2. Timing between data and ACK packet
NIC to access CSI [22], however, it still does not give users
full access to all the transmission parameters.
We have adopted a customized hardware platform, WARP,
which is a scalable and extensible programmable wireless plat-
form and allows fast prototype of physical layer algorithms.
The WARP team has developed an 802.11 reference design,
which is a real-time FPGA implementation of the IEEE 802.11
OFDM PHY and DCF MAC for WARP v3 hardware. In
order to control the behavior of the PHY and MAC without
interfering with the real-time operation of the wireless inter-
faces, the WARP team has developed a Python experiments
framework, which can log the transmission parameters, such
as timestamp, rate, transmission power, received signal power,
channel estimation, etc. In the experiments framework, WARP
nodes are connected to a PC by a switch so the logged data
can be saved in the PC for further processing. This enables us
to verify the OFDM subcarrier’s channel response-based key
generation scheme on the WARP 802.11 reference design.
III. DESIGN OF THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
A. Test Scenarios
Alice and Bob are legitimate users attempting to establish
keys between each other. The experiments were carried out in a
lab with rich multipath, which is a typical indoor environment
with cupboards, chairs, desks, etc. Alice was set to move
randomly at a speed of about 1 m/s while Bob remained
stationary. We also tested a static scenario with both users
stationary. The experimental setup for the static scenario is
shown in Fig. 3. The two WARP boards were connected to
the PC by a switch so the data can be stored for off-line
processing.
B. WARP Setup
Both Alice and Bob were running the WARP 802.11
reference design. They were operating at channel 1 of the
2.4 GHz carrier frequency. Alice and Bob were configured as
AP and STA, respectively. As shown in Fig. 2, Alice sent
data packets to Bob every 960 µs1, which allows Bob to
get a noisy estimation of the channel ĤAB(f, ti). Bob was
associated to Alice so he transmitted ACK packets to Alice
on successful reception of unicast packets. The ACK is also
modulated by OFDM so Alice can get the channel estimation
1The WARP 802.11 reference design requires a transmission resolution of
64 µs.
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Fig. 3. The experiment system of the static scenario with two users (Alice
and Bob).
ĤBA(f, ti + ∆tab), where ∆tab is the difference between the
transmission time of the data packet sent by Alice and the
corresponding ACK packet sent by Bob and can be calculated
by
∆tab = tdata + tSIFS
= NOFDM × 80
B
+ tSIFS, (3)
where B is the channel spacing, and tSIFS is the time of the
SIFS and equals to 16 µs in a 20 MHz channel spacing IEEE
802.11 OFDM system. In order to ensure a high correlation
between the measurements of Alice and Bob, ∆tab should be
kept as small as possible. In the MAC packet, the MAC header
is 24 bytes, frame check sequence (FCS) is 4 bytes, and the
minimum MAC payload required by the WARP is 20 bytes,
therefore we configured the length of the MAC packets lMAC
to be 48 in order to keep the duration of the packet as small
as possible. Commercial WiFi systems will adjust data rate
adaptively according to the channel condition, however, we
configure the WARP system to run at the same rate in order
to simplify the design. Ideally, the system should run at the
maximum allowed rate, i.e., 54 Mbps, in order to minimize
∆tab. However, it will suffer from a high bit error rate (BER)
when the channel is bad so less packets will be correctly
received. As a compromise, we ran the system at a rate of
18 Mbps, i.e., R = 3/4 and Nbpsc = 2. ∆tab equals 60 µs
when the system is configured as above. This time difference is
very small and can ensure the environments experienced by the
data packets and the corresponding ACK packets are almost
the same. In a slow fading environment, this only contributes
a very small displacement. When Alice is moving at a speed
of 1 m/s, the distance she moves in this time interval is only
0.006 cm.
Alice broadcast Beacon frames every 100 ms which helped
keep all of the users in the network synchronized. Bob can
regularly update his timing through the timestamp received in
the Beacon frames. This is quite important as there are fre-
quency differences between the oscillators of different boards
which results in a time drift and the timestamps of different
users will deviate if they are not synchronized. There is no Tx
address in the ACK packet, which can only be distinguished
by its temporal location compared to the timestamp of the data
packets. Therefore, keeping users synchronized is essential to
pair their channel measurements.
IV. VERIFICATION OF KEY GENERATION PRINCIPLES
Key generation is based on three principles, i.e., temporal
variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation [9].
Temporal variation guarantees the randomness of the key
sequence; channel reciprocity ensures that Alice and Bob can
generate the same key sequence, while spatial decorrelation
promises that an passive eavesdropper cannot get the same
key sequence as either Alice or Bob. In this paper, we verified
the first two principles by the data collected from the WARP
boards. We ran all of the experiments for 300 s and sampled
around 300,000 channel measurements for each user. The total
experiment time is much larger than the coherence time of
the channel, which is long enough to represent the channel
variation and can get a high accurate correlation calculation.
The amplitudes of the channel responses are used for the
numerical calculation.
A. Temporal Variation
There are research efforts exploiting randomness from
temporal, frequency and spatial domain. However, temporal
variation is the most common and convenient source for key
generation as the randomness can be simply introduced by the
movement of the users and/or objects. Temporal variation can
be quantified by the temporal autocorrelation function (ACF),
which is defined as
RĤuv (fm,∆t) =
E[|Ĥuv(fm, t)||Ĥuv(fm, t+ ∆t)]|
E[|Ĥuv(fm, t)|2]
. (4)
The temporal ACF describes how fast the signal decorrelates
in the time domain. An interval that is too short between two
adjacent measurements will result in redundancy and impact
the randomness of the key sequence. An interval that is too
long will result in a low KGR.
In a rich scattering multipath environment, the channel can
be modelled as a wide sense stationary uncorrelated scattering
(WSSUS) random process [26]. Under this assumption, we
have already shown in [23] that OFDM subcarrier’s channel
response is a WSS random process. As a random process
satisfies WSS property, data sampled by the same period will
have the same correlation relationship.
RĤAB (f1,∆t) and RĤBA(f1,∆t) of the mobile scenario
are selected as examples and shown in Fig. 4. As may
be observed from the figure, the ACFs observed at t1 and
t2 match each other, indicating that both ĤAB(fm, t) and
ĤBA(fm, t) are WSS random processes, which is consistent
with the simulation results in [23].
B. Channel Reciprocity
For a communication link between Alice and Bob, the
signals observed at each end of the link are reciprocal.
However, users need to detect and measure the received signal
using hardware devices, most of which work in half duplex
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ĤBA
(f1,∆t), at t2
R
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Fig. 4. Normalized temporal ACF of ĤAB(f1, t) and ĤBA(f1, t). t2 =
t1 + 10 s.
mode and introduce noise. Cross-correlation between their
measurements can be used to describe the signal similarity,
which is defined as
ρXY =
E{XY } − E{X}E{Y }√
E{X2} − E{X}2√E{Y 2} − E{Y }2 , (5)
where X = |ĤAB(fm, t)| and Y = |ĤBA(fm, t+ ∆tab)|.
Cross-correlation is usually impacted by asynchronous mea-
surements, noise, hardware difference, etc. Although most
of the current commercial wireless devices cannot transmit
simultaneously, the time difference of the measurements of
Alice and Bob can be kept very small as described in Sec-
tion III-B. Therefore, in a slow fading channel, the impact
of asynchronous measurements can be minimized. The noise
experienced in each user is independent and uncorrelated as
it resides in two separate hardware devices. Therefore, noise
represents the main factor that impacts the cross-correlation
of the measurements.
The cross-correlation coefficients of static and mobile sce-
narios are shown in Fig. 5. In the static scenario, noises
are the only contributor to the signal variation, therefore, the
correlation coefficients of all the subcarriers are almost zero
because noises are independent and uncorrelated. In the mobile
case, the correlation relationship is much better as when Alice
was moving the channel changed significantly. The correlation
relationship is inversely proportional to KDR, which will be
analyzed in Section V-D.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. System Overview
We use the same key generation system proposed in [23].
Both users exploit randomness from OFDM subcarrier’s chan-
nel responses. A cumulative distribution function (CDF)-based
quantization scheme is adopted to map the OFDM subcarrier’s
channel response to binary values. Secure sketch and universal
hash function are used as information reconciliation and
privacy amplification techniques, respectively.
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Fig. 5. Cross correlation in static and mobile scenario.
B. Randomness
The generated key sequence is generally used for cryp-
tographic applications. A key with redundancy results in a
decrease of the security level of the data encryption. Therefore,
randomness is the most important feature of the generated
key sequence. We use National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) randomness test suite [27] to verify the
randomness of the key sequence, which is also used by many
other researchers [9], [10], [12], [13], [18].
There are 15 tests in total, each evaluating a specific ran-
domness feature, e.g., frequency test focuses on the proportion
of ones and zeros, DFT test detects the periodic feature of the
sequence, etc. All the tests return a P-value, which is compared
to a significance value α, whose typical value is in the range
of [0.001, 0.01]. When P-value > α, the sequence is accepted
as random. We chose α as 0.01, the same as other work. Some
of the tests require extremely long sequence, e.g., random
excursions variant test recommends the input sequence longer
than 106, which is currently not available in our experiments.
Therefore, we ran 8 tests, which still satisfies the requirements
of NIST.
The channel was originally sampled at a rate of 960 µs, at
which rate there would definitely be redundancy between adja-
cent data samples. Therefore, we resampled the measurements
by a period of Tp, quantized the resampled OFDM subcarrier’s
channel responses and finally applied the NIST randomness
tests to the binary values.
The randomness test results are shown in Table I, where
the grey cells fail the randomness test, i.e., P-value < α. As
may be observed from the table, when the correlation between
the adjacent two measurements is high, the key sequence fails
several tests. In this example, the system cannot generate a
random key sequence until the probing period Tp reaches 1.5 s
and the correlation coefficient between adjacent samples is
25%. The optimal probing period can be determined in this
way rather than picking a large enough value, which could
exploit the randomness as efficiently as possible.
C. KGR
As the generated key sequence is used for cryptographic
application which requires a certain length of key sequence,
the KGR will affect the practical application of key generation
system. It is mainly determined by the variation of the channel,
TABLE I
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES QUANTIZED FROM
ĤAB(fm, t). THE GREY CELLS FAIL THE RANDOMNESS TEST.
Corr coeff X% 61.2% 48.3% 37.8% 32.4% 25%
Tp (s) 0.1 0.5 1 1.2 1.5
Sequence length 2978 598 298 248 198
Frequency 1 1 0.908 0.899 0.887
Block frequency 0 0.108 0.32 0.377 0.724
Runs 0 0 0.003 0.002 0.011
Longest run of 1s 0 0 0.184 0.137 0.258
DFT 0.112 0.058 0.41 0.641 0.493
Serial 0 0 0.051 0.098 0.1850 0.138 0.116 0.683 0.457
Appro. entropy 0 0 0.039 0.004 0.025
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.191 0.537 0.752 0.848 0.7
Cum. sums (rev) 0.191 0.537 0.643 0.733 0.831
therefore, it does not make sense to compare KGR of two
systems applied in two environments with different Doppler
spread. KGR can be improved by extracting keys from a finer-
grained channel information, e.g., OFDM subcarrier’s channel
responses. In this paper, we have verified the feasibility to
extract keys from individual subcarrier. This approach has a
major advantage over existing key extraction schemes, particu-
larly in frequency-selective fading channels, whereby multiple
subcarriers falling outside the coherence bandwidth can be
explored in order to improve the KGR. Therefore, OFDM
subcarrier’s channel response-based key generation system can
offer a better performance in terms of KGR compared to single
dimension-based key generation systems, such as RSS-based
systems.
D. KDR
KDR is the raw disagreement rate after quantization, which
is defined as
KDR =
∑N
i=1 |KA(i)−KB(i)|
N
, (6)
where KA and KB are the quantized bits of Alice and
Bob, respectively, and N is the length of keys. Information
reconciliation is used to correct the mismatch, which is upper
bounded by the correction capacity. For example, BCH code
can correct up to 0.25 disagreement [28]. The KDR in static
and mobile scenarios are shown in Fig. 6. As may be observed
from the figure, KDR of all the subcarriers between Alice
and Bob in the mobile scenario are within the BCH code’s
correction capacity (0.25). Therefore, Alice and Bob can agree
on the same key after the information reconciliation stage.
However, when all the users remained static, the KDR is
around 0.5, which is no better than random guess. Therefore,
in a static environment where noise is the only contributor to
the randomness, it is not amenable to key generation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a practical key generation system
by exploiting randomness from OFDM subcarrier’s channel
responses. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first paper that practically extracts keys from OFDM
subcarrier’s channel responses. In particular, we carried out the
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Fig. 6. Key disagreement rate in static and mobile scenario.
experiments by using WARP 802.11 reference design, which
supports IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and DCF MAC. This
enables us to extract OFDM subcarrier’s channel responses
through channel estimation. We configured the network as
infrastructure BSS and used Beacon frames sent by the AP
to keep all the users synchronized. The data and ACK packets
were used to measure the channel and the time interval
between the transmissions of these packets can be kept very
small. In this way, we can suppress the effect on the channel
reciprocity impacted by asynchronous measurements as small
as possible. We have verified temporal variation and channel
reciprocity. We have also evaluated the performance of our
OFDM subcarrier’s channel response-based key generation
system in terms of randomness, KGR and KDR. Through the
verification and performance evaluation, we find that OFDM
subcarrier’s channel responses are suitable for key generation.
Verification of spatial decorrelation and key generation from
multiple subcarriers will be our next step.
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